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Enhancing Industry Association Theory: A Comparative Business 
History Contribution 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Our comparative business historical examination of industry associations aims to 
enrich the under-theorized study of this distinctive type of meta-organization. We 
compare two New Zealand industry associations operating in the same supply chain 
but with differing degrees of associative capacity and types of external architecture. 
Our analysis of these associations builds on two strands of theory that rarely 
communicate with each other: new institutional economics (NIE) and organizational-
institutional theory (OIT). We demonstrate how NIE describes the structural 
potentialities for associational strength, while OIT addresses the relational context 
within associations. In turn, NIE’s examination of external influences reinforces OIT 
suggestions that associations which are rich in social capital can become 
developmental in orientation. Our historical analysis supplies fresh theoretical insights 
into industry associations, thereby addressing conceptual issues of interest to 
management scholars who study bridging-type organizations. On this basis, we argue 
that business history and organization studies complement each other.  
 
 
Keywords: business history, industry associations, meta-organizations, organization 
theory 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is time to move industry associations towards the forefront of research within 
organization studies. They fit newly derived organizational categories that seek to 
encapsulate large scale member-driven organizations, and display the hallmark 
features of Ahrne and Brunsson’s (2008) ‘meta-organizations’ – organizations whose 
constituent members are other organizations. To date, however, industry associations 
have received scant attention from organizational researchers, even when they employ 
germane categories. The ‘bridging organization’ is a case in point: although this 
concept provides a useful shorthand description of the purpose and activities of 
industry associations, theorists in this field have focused their attention elsewhere 
(Brown, 1991; Lawrence and Hardy, 1999). Our article seeks to rectify this neglect by 
using a comparative business history approach to identify the circumstances under 
which associations serve as effective devices for inter-firm coordination and industry 
development. We contribute to the management literature an enhanced theoretical 
explanation of industry association effectiveness, but one that is grounded in fine-
grained historical analysis of the structure and activities of two associations: the New 
Zealand Wool Brokers Association (NZWBA) and the New Zealand Port Employers 
Association (NZPEA).  
These associations share many similarities as service providers in the same 
national supply chain. Their primary historical records, however, reveal that the 
NZWBA was a successful vehicle for cooperation among its members, and for 
industry development, whereas the NZPEA was unsuccessful. The divergent 
experiences of two similar associations provide the opportunity to address why some 
industry associations succeed as coordination and industry developmental 
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mechanisms, while others fail at that task. A comprehensive explanation is not 
available in the wider literature of industry associations, in large part due to 
theoretical fragmentation. We seek to overcome this fragmentation by combining two 
broad theoretical perspectives on industry associations: the New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) and an eclectic perspective with roots in sociology and politics, 
which we describe as Organizational-Institutional Theory (OIT). There have been few 
attempts to integrate the insights of these perspectives for understanding industry 
associations and the role they play in coordinating the activities of competing firms 
and developing whole industries. 
Proceeding from this theoretical foundation, our article illustrates how 
business history and organization studies complement each other, first by providing 
deeper understanding of a distinctive type of meta-organization, and second in 
methodological terms. Unlike much management research, which seeks to clarify 
causal relationships on the basis of abstractions from cross-sectional data, we use 
comparative and counterfactual analysis to identify the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for industry association success. Comparisons and counterfactual 
reasoning are mainstays of the historian’s methodological repertoire (Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer, 2003; Weinryb, 2009). While the comparative method has a lengthy 
history within organization studies (Etzioni, 1961), we show how combining this 
method with robust counterfactual reasoning provides a powerful way of using 
historical data for the purpose of organizational theorizing. By interweaving historical 
and theoretical analysis with the aim of better understanding a prevalent bridging-type 
organization, we address recent calls to fulfil Alfred Chandler’s legacy by re-
establishing business history as a necessary complement to organization theory 
(Kipping and Üsidken, 2008).  
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In view of the gap in understanding the conditions for the success of industry 
associations, we use the comparative and counterfactual methods to answer the 
following questions. First, what are the determinants of the internal strength of 
industry associations? Second, under what circumstances might strong industry 
associations forego rent-seeking in order to promote industry and economic 
development? We know that associations have the potential to foster industry self-
regulation that enhances standards and builds capacity (Bennett, 2000; Streeck and 
Kenworthy, 2005), but how is this potential realized? We derive answers by applying 
to our case associations theoretical categories drawn from NIE and OIT, while using 
the comparative and counterfactual methods to explain the performance differences 
and thus to test and further refine these strands of theory. Two sets of findings emerge 
from our analysis. First, a key determinant of an industry association’s internal 
strength is its level of social capital, such that associability cannot be automatically 
inferred from the association’s industry sector (cf. Traxler, 2007a). Second, an 
association’s industry strengthening ability is a product both of its internal associative 
capacity and the conditions it faces in its wider competitive, political and regulatory 
environments. We show that the effects of this external environmental architecture are 
subtly nuanced and frequently understated.  
 The next section presents the conceptual apparatus of NIE and OIT that 
informs our work on industry associations. We then describe the benefits of our 
historical research methods by situating our article at the intersection of business 
history and organization studies. A third section introduces the two associations and 
their historical settings, and investigates their internal organizational features and their 
external influences and relationships. The concluding section shows how our 
comparative historical analysis extends existing theoretical work on industry 
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associations, and how the theory-building role of business history enhances 
organization studies.  
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS 
 
Understood as a ‘meta-organization’, an industry association is a third-party member-
based organization with a brokerage role, membership of which is voluntary, and 
whose members retain their distinctive organizational identity (Ahrne and Brunsson, 
2008, p. 3). The recency of the meta-organizations category, however, means that the 
attendant conceptual apparatus is underdeveloped. Likewise, most bridging 
organizations have the preceding characteristics (Westley and Vredenburg, 1991), but 
bridging organization scholars and theories concentrate on community based activist 
organizations and voluntary associations whose members are more diverse than the 
profit-seeking firms that typically comprise an industry association (Brown, 1991; 
Lawrence and Hardy, 1999; Geys and Murdoch, 2008). While recognizing the 
relevance to industry associations of these overarching organizational categories, in 
view of their conceptual and scope limitations, we put a layer of theory beneath them 
by drawing on a wide-ranging literature that spans sociology, politics and institutional 
economics.  
Industry association theory is split between political and organizational 
sociology, on the one hand (Coleman and Grant, 1988; Schmitter and Streeck, 1999; 
Streeck and Kenworthy, 2005), the threads of which we draw together as the OIT 
perspective, and New Institutional Economics (NIE) on the other (North 1990; Doner 
and Schneider, 2000a). There have been few attempts to integrate NIE and OIT 
(Schneiberg and Hollingsworth, 1991; Doner and Schneider, 2000b; Berk and 
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Schneiberg, 2005). Scholars rarely use these perspectives in conjunction with each 
other to explain the internal organizing challenges faced by industry associations, nor 
to grasp the external effects of robust industry associations as industry strengtheners. 
To the extent that our subsequent comparison of two associations combines the 
insights of NIE and OIT, the purpose of this section is to demonstrate that they are 
complementary, rather than competitive, perspectives on industry associations. 
 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
Following on from the pioneering work of Douglass C. North (North and Thomas, 
1973; North, 1990), NIE scholars have consistently focused on institutional devices 
that limit opportunism and reduce transaction costs. Recent work by Doner and 
Schneider (2000a, 2000b) identified industry associations as a vehicle for mitigating 
important sources of market imperfection that lie at the crux of NIE analysis (North, 
1986; Williamson, 2000). In essence, they argue, associations facilitate exchange 
through reducing transaction costs (by mediation and by improving information 
flows), attenuate the need for hierarchy through mitigating agency problems (by 
reducing information asymmetries), and promote cooperation through resolving 
collective action dilemmas (by providing incentives). Their work provides a new line 
of thinking in the NIE tradition since associations were an organizational form 
previously neglected by such scholars. Moreover, they go on to address two central 
questions to the study of industry associations: the structural design issues affecting 
their associative capacity, and the circumstances under which associations go beyond 
rent-seeking to facilitate wider improvements in economic and business performance.  
High member density, or encompassment, they argue, is a central aspect of 
associative capacity (Doner and Schneider, 2000b, p. 16). It enhances the 
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association’s influence over the industry and its claim to speak representatively, and it 
mitigates free riding by non-members or the emergence of a rival organization. Where 
high density is achieved through a small number of members in a concentrated 
industry, this reduces the costs of administering the association, particularly in 
securing cooperation, participation, and honest behaviour. Conversely, where 
membership is dominated by a few large organizations with their own substantial 
resources and powerful internal bureaucracies, they may be less inclined to make a 
major commitment to an association, believing the benefits accruing to be limited. 
The most effective way to achieve encompassment is to make membership of 
the association highly attractive. Olson (1965) described the tangible ‘selective 
benefits’ that an association offers only to its members as club goods, such as shared 
physical assets and enhanced transacting powers. Intangible selective benefits are also 
prized, particularly the reputational signals that membership emits. In many cases, 
membership is an explicit indication of trustworthiness and creditworthiness where 
defaulters and bankrupts are expelled (Carnevali, 2004, p. 543). The ability of 
associations to mediate business disputes among members can provide a more swift, 
transparent, and low cost resolution than court orders. In turn, the existence of such 
explicit and implicit signals strengthens the enforcement powers of associations, 
expulsion being reputationally more damaging than non-membership.  
While associative capacity explains how effectively an association can pursue 
its aims, the nature of those aims is strongly conditioned by pressures in the external 
environment. Given its emphasis on mechanisms that limit opportunism (Clague, 
1997; Miller, 2005), NIE emphasizes external control and constraint as being the main 
reason why industry associations may transcend rent-seeking imperatives and assume 
a ‘market-complementing’ role (Doner and Schneider, 2000a, p. 263). Doner and 
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Schneider (2000a, pp. 275-8) argue that ‘third-party enforcement’, particularly by 
governments, transactors, and competitive international markets, will pressure 
associations to become more efficient. Governments and associations often work 
closely together, enabling the former to seek opinions and diffuse policy, and 
providing the latter with an opportunity for lobbying. Governments have conferred on 
associations various selective benefits, extending in some cases to compulsory 
membership. This interaction has provided governments with opportunities to 
pressure associations to seek improved economic performance in their sector of 
influence in return for the privileges of association. The relationship also enables 
governments to monitor more closely any rent-seeking activities. Enforcement can 
come from other third parties associated with the industry, especially organizations 
engaged in upstream and downstream activities that are eager to avoid incurring the 
consequences of anticompetitive behavior while encouraging efficiency gains along 
the value chain.  Finally, as firms experience ‘market vulnerability’ during economic 
downturns, they exert themselves to cut costs for their members. Increasing market 
power is also much more difficult in such conditions. 
 
Organizational-Institutional Theory (OIT) 
The primary focus of NIE as far as the internal features of associations are concerned 
is on the structural characteristics designed to reduce free-riding. Just as 
institutionalism shifted the analysis of organizational structure in mainstream 
organizational theory to social formations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1991), 
OIT differs from NIE by focusing on the social processes underlying industry 
association structure. OIT addresses the inherent ‘problem of associability’ when 
membership is voluntary (Traxler, 2007a, p. 15), and how goal formation and the 
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resulting character of the association are influenced by the socio-economic 
background and micro-social interactions of members (Bennett, 2000). OIT also 
singles out the State – or governments understood sociologically (Jessop, 2008) – as 
the key external influence on associations (Coleman, 1985; Coleman and Grant, 1988; 
Schmitter and Streeck, 1999). OIT changes the emphasis from ‘the government’, 
construed in NIE terms as essentially ‘an institutional arrangement’ that defines and 
enforces ‘property rights’ (North and Thomas, 1973, p. 97), to a sociologically-
inflected analysis of State influence and structures – including corporatism (Streeck 
and Kenworthy, 2005).  
OIT shows that the goals and objectives of industry associations are often 
diverse and prone to change (Berk and Schneiberg, 2005), rather than being static or 
predefined by the conditions of market failure. OIT is also amenable to sociological 
insights concerning the influence of member orientation and commitment on 
organizational focus and strength (Etzioni, 1961), and the importance to robust 
member-based organizations of strong communal ties between members that generate 
social capital (Coleman, 1988). OIT is therefore compatible with an eclectic mix of 
approaches that focus on the social connectedness and embeddedness of actors in 
economic and organizational settings (Grannovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1988; Walker et 
al., 1997; Wenger, 1998). In line with embeddedness arguments, the recognition of 
common interest is shaped by the micro-social embeddedness of industry association 
members within a ‘relational setting’ (Somers, 1994, p. 626), which acts as a 
repository of shared understandings. Commonalities in social and professional 
background and aspirations of the members of the association may foster an innate 
sense of cooperation (Grannovetter, 1985). These kinds of network-based social 
 11 
relationships promote association cohesion, to the extent that social capital functions 
as ‘a means of enforcing norms of behaviour’ (Walker et al., 1997, p. 111).  
OIT furthermore regards industry associations as having the capacity to move 
beyond merely resolving the problems of market failure, to which NIE draws 
attention, by providing new opportunities for industry and firm development through 
reflexive organizational learning (Berk and Schneiberg, 2005; Rosenkopf and 
Tushman, 1998). The key point of difference with NIE is the assumption that a 
developmental or industry enhancement role by an association may occur in a 
volitional manner, without being prompted or necessitated by forceful external 
controls. Associations that take this role resemble ‘a community of mutual 
engagement’ (Wenger, 1998, p. 126), they exhibit strong member self-discipline (van 
Waarden, 1985; 1995), and possess the attendant capacity for industry self-
government (Streeck and Kenworthy, 2005, p. 455).  
By extending the notion of governmentality to include both corporatism and 
self-regulation, OIT provides an additional dimension to NIE’s emphasis on how the 
market-complementing role of industry associations may be spurred by the 
enforcement characteristics of government action. A key OIT insight is that 
corporatist systems, in countries such as Australia and New Zealand with strong 
‘state-licensed structures of interest intermediation’ (Traxler, 2007b, p. 5), have a 
significant role in shaping the character and activities of industry associations 
(Streeck and Kenworthy, 2005). Moreover, for OIT the relationship between industry 
associations and governmentality is not exhausted by State regulation. Industry 
associations may themselves assume a State-like role as a kind of ‘private 
government’ that fosters behavioural self-regulation (Schmitter and Streeck, 1999, p. 
57).  
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Integrating NIE and OIT 
Our comparative analysis of two New Zealand industry associations integrates the 
respective insights of these perspectives. With regard to the internal strength of 
industry associations, NIE highlights the organizational structural designs and 
incentivizing and sanctioning devices that are intended to minimize collective action 
dilemmas. OIT complements this view by providing insight into the social processes 
behind the structural devices that militate against free-riding. Each perspective also 
addresses the industry strengthening role of associations in a complementary manner. 
While NIE points to the importance of external constraints in the adoption of this role, 
OIT shows how an industry strengthening emphasis may also be projected upwards 
from the grassroots level, based on communal social ties that establish trust and 
shared expectations of behaviour among association members. 
 
BUSINESS HISTORY METHODS AND ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 
 
Our approach to engaging business history with organization studies suggests that 
each has strengths from which the other may benefit. How exactly business history 
complements the study of organizations has been debated both by historians and 
organizational analysts (Kieser, 1994; Clark and Rowlinson, 2004; Leblebici and 
Shah, 2004; Kipping and Üsidken, 2008). The resulting roles into which business 
history is cast range from subservience to near equivalence with organization theory, 
as modes of inquiry into the structure, functioning and development of organizations 
(Üsdiken and Kieser, 2004). The subservience role has, however, a tendency to win 
out. How historians are trained makes them prone to leaving key theoretical 
presuppositions implicit within their writing, as they ‘operate within an implicit 
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paradigmatic framework that is shared by most of the practitioners of the discipline’ 
(Lloyd, 2008, p. 402.). Business historians are as guilty of pulling the blinds on theory 
as social or labour historians. Any engagement between organization studies and 
business history thus risks the latter being relegated, as Allport (1942, p. 55) might 
say, to the status of a helpless empiricist tail to the theory-laden organization studies 
kite. This is the classic ‘underlabourer’ role for a discipline (Winch, 1958, p. 3), 
wherein historians merely supply the primary archive-based studies that organization 
scholars then appropriate with a broader theoretical purpose in mind (e.g. Newton, 
2004).  
Mindful of Clark and Rowlinson’s (2004) warning to business historians about 
the pitfalls of cramming history into essentialist organizational categories, we reject 
the underlabourer view. Rather than subsuming historical approaches into 
organization studies, we demonstrate that one important role for business historical 
research is in circumstances where there are disparate or competing bodies of theory 
that vie for the attention of organization scholars. Industry association theory is a case 
in point. Simply stated, recourse to historical cases helps to overcome theoretical 
fragmentation. Our comparative analysis illustrates how the insights of NIE and OIT 
can be merged by applying modes of thought and analysis that business historians 
regularly use, expertly but albeit often tacitly, in the analysis of primary materials. 
The passage of time provided by the historical approach provides a sharper and more 
complete focus for eliciting comparative differences, for counterfactual reasoning, the 
specification of the conditions of necessity versus sufficiency, and an appreciation of 
how organizing potential may be realized in practice. The separation in time of actors 
from researchers means that archival research, unlike participatory contemporary 
research, avoids obtruding on the behaviour of actors (Welch, 2000). In addition, it 
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can provide access to sensitive and confidential information, the absence of which 
conceals key motivations in much empirical research. Where there is rich extant 
archival material it can provide ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973), which is replete 
with specific detail from a range of complementary sources.  
Being able to chart the fortunes of organizations like NZWBA and NZPEA 
over several decades, based on fine-grained analysis of their primary records, 
provides rich qualitative data that has perspective. This is essential for the proper 
analysis of counterfactuals (Hawthorne, 1991). Historically grounded counterfactual 
analysis, in turn, helps researchers to distinguish conditions of necessity from 
conditions of sufficiency (Tucker, 2009, p. 100). Combined with a detailed 
comparison of the two associations, this method enables us to specify what makes 
some industry associations effective and others ineffective. We show that ‘single 
comparisons’ involving a pair of similar organizations, such as NZWBA and NZPEA, 
do in fact ‘yield theoretical gains’ (Rueschemeyer, 2003, p. 306). The next section 
specifies how our comparative business historical study provides a rich empirical 
basis for an enhanced theoretical understanding of the activities of industry 
associations.  
 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWO INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS  
 
Our associations developed against the backdrop of a distinctive colonial heritage 
shared by dominion societies (Ehrensaft and Armstrong, 1978). New Zealand’s 
economic development since British settlement in the mid nineteenth century has 
been founded on the export of staple commodities particularly wool, refrigerated dairy 
products, and frozen meat. While the economy diversified into services and 
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manufacturing in the course of the twentieth century, commodity exports remained at 
the core of the nation’s economy (Hawke, 1985). A long and complex supply chain 
has been required to move these commodities from the farm gate into the hands of the 
overseas purchaser. Growing, financing, transporting, storing, selling and exporting 
the annual wool clip, for example, was an enormous enterprise involving many actors: 
graziers and farmers, shearers, stock and station agents, the railway companies, banks, 
insurance companies, freight forwarders, wool brokers, wool buyers, stevedores, the 
port authorities, carters, storemen and packers, shipping agents and shipping 
companies. Money changed hands along this chain for services rendered. However, 
these commercial transactions were not conducted at arm’s length between parties 
who bought and sold solely on the basis of price. Rather they were relational 
interactions embedded within a social and institutional substrate (Granovetter, 1985). 
The commodity trades, in particular, depended on associations and institutions whose 
role was to further the aims of the parties through negotiation and communication. 
Firms, who were competitors at one level, formed associations that gave them a 
collective voice in negotiating with other organizations and resolved issues within 
their own industry.  
Two of the key groups in the supply chain were the wool brokers, who 
managed disposal of the wool at large centralized auctions, and the port employers, 
who arranged for its delivery and safe stowage on board ship prior to its long sea 
passage to foreign markets. Industry associations were formed by the leading firms in 
both groups, the New Zealand Wool Brokers Association (NZWBA, formed in 1907) 
and the New Zealand Port Employers Association (NZPEA, formed in 1949). 
Industry associations as an institution are by their nature heterogeneous in size, 
function, and location. Our two associations share many similarities particularly their 
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location in the same agricultural commodity export chain, and in a sector that is 
known to be highly suitable for comparative studies of industry associations due to 
their prevalence and corporatist-style arrangement (Grant, 1987, pp. 4-5). Moreover, 
they both functioned as service providers although the NZWBA served product 
market interests and NZPEA labour market interests.  
The records of both associations are held by New Zealand’s Alexander 
Turnbull Library (hereafter ATL), which is part of the National Library of New 
Zealand in Wellington. The richness of this archival evidence permits a close 
comparative examination of their performance and an assessment against, and 
reconciliation of, the differing theoretical standpoints identified in the previous 
section. Our primary data includes minutes of meetings, correspondence, annual 
reports, and associational rules and regulations, which provide the level of focus 
required by business historical analysis.1 We analyze the internal dynamics of the 
associations, followed by their external industry effects.  
 
Internal Organizing Challenges 
Two key insights of NIE are that high member density is important to the ability of an 
industry association to achieve internal organizational strength, and that the provision 
of selective benefits limits opportunistic behaviour by members (Doner and 
Schneider, 2000b). This section describes the level of encompassment and selective 
benefits provided by each association. Counterfactual reasoning is then used to argue 
that these are necessary but not sufficient conditions for creating internal 
organizational cohesion and industry association strength. The latter depends, in 
particular, on social capital formation and overcoming the erosive effects of spatial 
distance on member control.  
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Organizational Structure and Membership Composition 
 Both NZWBA and NZPEA were encompassing organizations that spanned their 
respective industries as ‘comprehensive’ industry associations (Coleman and Grant, 
1988). NZWBA’s membership consisted of the regional associations (see Figure 1), 
which had come into existence in the late nineteenth century in response to the growth 
of the local wool market. Most regional associations joined at the time of NZWBA’s 
formation in 1907, although a few were added by 1911, persuaded by four years of 
successful cooperation among the associations, and the achievement of measurable 
progress in resolving issues with the New Zealand Wool Buyers Association. Seven 
of the eight wool auction centers had regional associations that were NZWBA 
members in 1911 and between them accounted for 98 percent of the wool auctioned in 
New Zealand.2 Membership density remained high throughout its history, bolstering 
its right to represent local brokers and gain access to government, thereby displaying a 
‘logic of influence’ (Schmitter and Streeck, 1999, p. 19), while mitigating the risk of 
free riding on its role as contributor to the public good. Applications for membership 
went to an election, with rejection signified by the casting of three black balls.3 In 
practice, there was no general attempt to limit entry, and fees were set at relatively 
modest levels (ATL, MSY-4135, NZWBA Minute Book). 
---------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------- 
The number of members remained comparatively small and stable, which 
reduced the costs of administration and made it easier to gain cooperation on 
decisions. A contraction in membership in the latter half of the twentieth century 
 18 
reflected the reduction in selling centers through amalgamation and rationalization in 
the industry rather than reduced participation. 4  The membership of the regional 
associations was similarly small, stable, and dense. It comprised the local wool-
broking firms selling in the major centers (town members), and a country 
membership, with reduced powers and status, for local stock-and-station agents, who 
forwarded wool from smaller inland areas to the auction centers. Thus, in 1911 seven 
associations representing thirty-three local brokers and selling agents were members 
of NZWBA. The division between types of membership is indicated by the fact that 
twenty-four of these thirty-three members were brokers selling at the major ports. 
A group of wool brokers expanded nationally in the first few decades of the 
twentieth century to dominate the industry. The top five brokered one-half of the wool 
auctioned in New Zealand and developed national structures and policies: Dalgety, 
New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency, Wright Stephenson, National Mortgage 
and Agency, and Murray Roberts.5 Thus, the number of firms with a membership of 
more than one regional association became an important factor in the cooperative 
dynamics of the NZWBA. By 1911, 47 percent (twenty-four out of fifty-one) of 
memberships of regional associations were held by firms with more than one such 
membership nationally (ATL, MSY-4133, NZWBA Minutes, 1911). No firm, though, 
individually dominated the wool-broking industry or its associations: 18 percent was 
the maximum national market share held by any firm prior to major rationalization of 
the industry in the 1960s. Nor did any of the regional associations control the 
NZWBA: the maximum market share over the same period was 39 percent (Ville, 
2000, p. 129). The absence of a dominant firm or association suggested that either 
strong competitive rivalry would ensue or that leadership and direction might occur 
through cooperation and mutuality of interest. While these firms were fiercely 
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competitive with each other, they were operationally quite similar and shared many 
interests and goals that could be furthered through cooperation. 
Shortly after its formation, NZPEA also became an encompassing association 
with high member density. Matching information from its confidential annual reports 
during the 1950s, with official records of wages paid to waterfront workers, suggests 
that more than 80 per cent of firms (over 50) involved in stevedoring were members 
of the association. Despite NZPEA’s large and diverse membership, the industry was 
relatively concentrated: calculated on a wages paid basis, four shipping companies 
accounted for 62 per cent of employment in 1955 (Waterfront Industry Commission, 
1956, pp. 48-51). Companies joined NZPEA at the national level, and in so doing 
became members of local branches at the ports where they operated. Many small 
firms engaged in stevedoring at a few ports or even just a single port, but a handful of 
national shipping firms were members of several local branches. The resulting 
organizational structure is depicted in Figure 2.  
 
---------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------- 
In contrast to NZWBA, however, NZPEA was dominated by two sets of firms 
with different interests: the four Conference Lines that had longstanding contracts 
with New Zealand’s Producer Boards to ship highly seasonal primary product exports 
to Britain (Shaw Savill and Albion, P&O’s New Zealand Shipping Company, the 
Vestey family’s Blue Star line, and Port Line), and the numerous coastal shipping 
companies that ferried general cargo between the country’s ports or to Australia. 
These companies had their own associations, respectively the Overseas Shipowners 
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Committee (OSC) and the New Zealand Shipowners Federation (NZSF), whose 
members were represented on NZPEA’s Management Committee in equal 
proportion.6 In 1955, the shipping companies that Management Committee members 
represented accounted for 71 per cent of wages paid to waterside workers.  
The cost of time in port was the key matter on which the interests of OSC and 
NZSF differed. The coasters entered port more frequently than the deep-sea operators, 
which meant that costs associated with vessels lying idle at berth – while waterfront 
workers loaded and unloaded cargo – comprised a larger share of their total voyage 
costs. As repeat users of waterfront labour at multiple ports, the Management 
Committee’s NZSF representatives erred on the side of labour cost minimization. In 
contrast, the Conference Lines were more susceptible to hold up at peak export times, 
due to the problematic nature of transactions with labour or the harbour boards that 
supplied equipment, and were quick to cede pay concessions in order to avoid 
disruptive strike action. 
 
Selective Benefits and Dispute Resolution  
Membership of NZWBA and its constituent associations yielded significant benefits 
for brokers. Firms participated in joint local selling, which generated scale economies 
in physical infrastructure and marketing, particularly ownership of the saleroom, 
shared administration of the auctions, and joint catalogues. Membership conveyed 
participation in the national roster of sales, thereby avoiding clashes with other 
regional auctions. Many of the objectives and outcomes of NZWBA were best or 
solely captured through membership. These particularly included industry 
representation, enhancement of the auction system, and regulation of the market. 
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Active participation gave members a voice in these matters and in how the industry 
addressed major shifts in the external environment.   
Membership provided reputation guarantees for firms and associations. The 
expulsion of members who repeatedly breached association rules or sale conditions or 
were deemed guilty of ‘disgraceful or dishonourable conduct’, along with the 
blacklisting of deviant transactional parties, helped to protect members from 
opportunism. Graduated fines up to ₤50 and temporary suspensions distinguished the 
minor or occasional offender from the recidivist, and helped to balance the potentially 
conflicting aims of high membership density and effective enforcement. Through 
such rules, therefore, membership signaled trustworthiness and creditworthiness to 
other members and to other transactional parties, particularly growers and buyers. In 
addition, they would have enhanced their reputations through professional activities 
organized by, and associated with, NZWBA, such as setting standards and arranging 
classes for wool sorting in local technical institutes (ATL, MSX-4323, Wellington 
Woolbrokers Association Letterbook, 2/6/1910). 
The most significant tangible selective benefit of NZPEA membership 
stemmed from the New Zealand port system of collectivized resources, both human 
(pooled labour) and physical (common-use wharves and cargo-handling equipment). 
Queues of ships at the country’s ports were commonplace in the 1950s. Membership 
allowed the different shipping interests to participate in a rostering system for 
allocating each port’s government-administered labour pool and publicly-owned 
berths. However, this selective benefit diminished in the mid-1960s due to external 
environmental changes associated with technical progress, attendant shifts in the 
stevedoring industry’s firm composition, and increasing labour militancy. 
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Other services that NZPEA provided had the character of public goods from 
which selective benefits could not be derived, thereby leaving the association more 
exposed to free-riding. A prime example was NZPEA’s efforts to minimize wage 
competition by negotiating with federated port unions a national labour relations 
agreement, which set base rates and eliminated the need for spot contracting with 
labour. NZPEA non-member firms could free-ride when employing waterside 
workers, by using this agreement without directly contributing to the cost of its 
negotiation.  
For NZWBA, associational mediation of bilateral disputes between members 
or representation in disputes with members of other associations reduced the cost and 
time involved in resolution. NZWBA’s constitution contained instructions for dispute 
resolution. Cases were heard at a general meeting, where the issue was resolved by a 
majority vote of members (ATL, MSY-4135, NZWBA Rules and Regulations). The 
process was standardized, and the members were well placed to judge matters that 
were technical and specific to the trade. Under NZPEA’s rules, however, contested 
proposals at the Management Committee could only be confirmed by means of 
unanimous vote (ATL, 89-395-071, NZPEA Rules). The need to achieve unanimity 
meant that contentious issues took months or even years to resolve. Agreement to 
press the unions for shiftwork to extend the hours of port operation, which the 
Conference Lines sought but coastal companies considered too expensive, took 
almost three years to achieve (ATL, 89-395-203, 89-395-204, NZPEA Management 
Committee Meetings 394, 396 and 408). While NZPEA had a modicum of success at 
resolving differences of interest between the Conference Lines and coastal companies 
over the priority use of labour and equipment, the coasters remained fundamentally 
dissatisfied (ATL, 89-395-203, 89-395-204, NZPEA Management Committee 
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Meetings 314, 325 and 429). The Holm Shipping Company argued to a 1970 Royal 
Commission of Inquiry that ‘charity begins at home’, and advocated the development 
of a ‘standard code’ to allocate labour in favour of coastal ships (Museum of 
Wellington, City and Sea, New Zealand Shipowners Federation Records, B/33/10, 
3113/93, 106-108, Holm Shipping Company Limited to Royal Commission of Inquiry 
into New Zealand Shipping, 27/10/1970).  
 
Social Capital and Long-distance Control  
Despite NZPEA being an encompassing association, the selective benefits it provided 
were not sufficient by themselves to preclude opportunistic behaviour by firms, and 
its mediation mechanisms could not overcome fundamental differences of member 
interest that stemmed from large numbers and member heterogeneity. The 
comparative case of NZWBA affords insight into the counterfactual. If NZPEA had 
supplied greater selective benefits and been better at resolving disputes between 
members, its cohesion would not have increased proportionately. The NZWBA case 
shows that selective benefits and effective dispute resolution are necessary but not 
sufficient for internal organizational strength – prerequisites of which include building 
social capital among members to elicit trust-based relationships, and establishing 
integration mechanisms that overcome the problem of ‘long-distance control’ (Law, 
1986, p. 234) by compensating for any lack of geographical propinquity among 
members.  
NZWBA developed considerable social capital in relationships forged at the 
regional level between member firms. Social networks and shared experiences 
reinforced the attractions of membership. The occupational backgrounds of senior 
managers, representing broking firms with the same heritage, were similar to one 
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another.7 Regionally, many employees went to the same schools, participated in the 
same social clubs, had worked as landowners and sheep farmers, and frequently 
moved between firms (Ville, 2000, pp. 60-1; Stone, 1987, pp. 123-4; Christensen, 
1986, p. 45). Such commonalities reinforced their desire to participate actively in the 
associations, as shown by the records of high attendance at meetings, the almost 
complete absence of threats of resignation, and an unwillingness to push divisive 
issues and minority viewpoints.8 NZWBA approximated a ‘closed network’ (Burt, 
2002, p. 154), in which strong social ties between members elicited high levels of 
normative commitment that militated against opportunistic behaviour and assisted 
with the mediation of disputes between members. These social capital-based ties also 
predisposed members to accept and submit to the Association’s rules. NZWBA’s 
regional association members frequently met face-to-face in community settings and 
the region-based representational structure, and its domination by a small group of 
national firms, provided effective cross-regional communication and linkages that 
overcame the geographical distance between members.  
In contrast, NZPEA manifested much lower levels of cooperative behaviour 
and had no effective solution to the problem of long-distance control. Members of the 
Conference Lines and coastal companies were of different national origin (Britain and 
New Zealand respectively), and the coasters were not above playing the nationalist 
card – as Holm’s aforementioned ‘charity’ comment suggests. It was an association 
afflicted by divergent sectionalist interests with little evidence of attempts to build 
social capital among members. Resignation threats by members were not uncommon: 
in 1965 Bob Owens, who built a transport conglomerate (The Owens Group) on the 
basis of stevedoring profits at the Port of Tauranga, contemplated breaking away from 
NZPEA to establish a separate association to represent newly emergent independent 
 25 
stevedoring companies (ATL, 89-395-203, NZPEA Management Committee Meeting 
371).  
The concomitant of NZPEA’s paucity of social capital was its difficulty 
controlling the activities of member firms, which were scattered around more than 20 
ports on New Zealand’s lengthy coastline. NZPEA’s port branches operated in line 
with the wishes of firms at each port, frequently with little recourse to the national 
Management Committee. Rules were openly flouted by members, particularly by 
striking local deals with trade unions, and transgressors were rarely sanctioned. 
NZPEA members and non-members alike sought to achieve labour cooperation either 
by ‘purchasing’ consent, in the manner of the Conference Lines, or by following the 
cue of coastal shipping companies that tolerated informal work practices. NZPEA’s 
national officials frequently called for member firms to provide ‘a standard 
application of [workplace] discipline’ (ATL, 89-395-202, NZPEA Annual General 
Meeting, 10/10/1964), but trust within the Association was so low that the 
Management Committee eventually resorted to costly monitoring through the 
appointment of a ‘Travelling Inspector’ who motored between ports observing work 
practices in an attempt to eliminate the member-tolerated informal practice of 
‘spelling’ (ATL, 89-395-131, NZPEA Annual Report, 31/3/1973).9 NZPEA’s efforts 
to influence the actions of its members ultimately failed because it had little control 
over firms and their internal agents, the managers who brokered these side-deals.  
Lack of social capital and member control increased NZPEA’s weakness in its 
negotiations with labour organizations. Despite being a centralized organization, it 
was unable to prevent union exploitation of member differences in relation to 
transactions with labour. Weak ties and low levels of trust between members meant 
that they failed to abide by the NZPEA’s rules, concerning the need for the 
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Management Committee to authorize all local agreements (ATL, 89-395-071, NZPEA 
Rules). The NZPEA’s representational structure did nothing to prevent opportunism 
as member firms did direct deals with local unions to secure labour cooperation, 
which had the effect of ‘bidding up’ labour rates above the national minima. As a 
result, NZPEA’s Management Committee failed to limit wage drift (Reveley, 2003, p. 
116). 
 
Synthesis of Findings 
NZWBA approximated a ‘high-involvement organization’ (Lawler, 1992), but for 
NZPEA the level of member involvement was low. This level is not automatically and 
unambiguously determined by how encompassing an industry association is, or by the 
selective benefits that it provides – despite the primacy NIE affords to each of these 
matters in accounting for association strength. Rather, high encompassment and the 
provision of club-like benefits merely supply favourable background conditions 
against which the fostering of normative commitment by members may occur. 
Drawing on the OIT perspective, whether an industry association becomes a high 
involvement – member-driven – organization is then determined by the extent to 
which there is a congenial relational context, rich in social capital, for the construction 
of shared understandings between members.  
 
External Industry Effects 
In accordance with the NIE view, NZWBA’s experience indicates the role of external 
constraints in influencing the behaviour of associations away from mere rent-seeking 
to promoting the broader interests of the industry and its economic setting. Of 
particular importance as constraining institutions were the highly competitive 
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international wool market, the wool buyers, and the State. However, their role 
extended beyond constraining rent-seeking activity, as a simple interpretation of the 
NIE literature might imply. Rather, when considered through the lens supplied by 
OIT, cooperative behaviour elicited by these external components steered the 
NZWBA in the direction of what Berk and Schneiberg (2005) call a developmental 
learning association. 
Many of the industry associations established in the late nineteenth century 
were believed to have colluded in an effort to counter a period of economic downturn 
and low profits. In Australia, for example, the Associated Northern Collieries was an 
agreement between major mine owners dealing with prices and profits (Fleming and 
Terwiel, 1999). This does not appear to have motivated the NZWBA. The fact that 
price fixing was not revealed in their archives nor an ongoing issue in relations with 
the buyers is perhaps unsurprising in light of the discipline imposed by a highly 
competitive international wool market. In contrast to coal, there were large numbers 
of wool producers. New Zealand’s share of the international wool market was less 
than 10 percent, while a further 25 to 30 percent was sold at the neighbouring ports of 
Australia (Abbott, 1998, p. 260). Wool also faced increasing competition from 
synthetic fibres by the 1920s. Instead, brokers and their associations supported an 
unfettered free market, and they were vocal in their opposition to post-World War II 
government proposals for price or output controls. NZWBA focused its thinking 
about the wool market towards shifting the point of sale from London to New 
Zealand. It acted as a powerful advocate of local auction selling in the face of 
opposition from London importing houses and brokers and, locally, from some of the 
British and Australasian banks with substantial interests in the London market. 
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NZWBA encouraged its members to sell locally with a view to establishing the scale 
of activity necessary to compete with the long-established London market. 
One of NZWBA’s key relationships was with the New Zealand Wool Buyers 
Association. As the representative body of wool buyers, they naturally maintained a 
watching brief over any attempts by the brokers to manipulate prices or volumes to 
the benefit of sellers. What is interesting about the evidence contained in NZWBA 
correspondence with the buyers association is the almost complete lack of discussion 
of, or concern about, market manipulation. Instead, the focus was on cooperative 
ways of building a more efficient auction system that would compete with the long 
established London market. Far from seeing a national representative of brokers as a 
threat, the buyers encouraged the formation of NZWBA as a sovereign governance 
structure that could serve as an effective communications channel for improving the 
operation of the wool market (ATL, 96-223-01, NZWBA Correspondence, 
8/11/1911). Developmental achievements through inter-associational cooperation 
centered on agreed practices that were codified in documents as routines. For 
example, a ‘conditions of sale’ document set rules on matters such as the conduct of 
the sale, the process for delivery of wool to the seller, and the point at which legal and 
insurance responsibility shifted from seller to buyer (ATL, 96-223-09, NZWBA 
Miscellaneous Papers; ATL, MSX-4323, Wellington Woolbrokers Association 
Letterbook, 19/7/1909).  
Another external constraint was the State, a key factor to which OIT draws 
attention (Streeck and Kenworthy, 2005). Close networks and channels of 
communication existed between the broking industry and successive governments, 
particularly as a consequence of political representation and socio-economic 
propinquity. As a result, State actors treated the NZWBA as a ‘private interest 
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government’ (Grant, 1987, p. 12) that managed the affairs of the industry and 
regulated the behaviour of its players. Where direct involvement occurred it was as 
much intended to address issues of mutual interest, such as through the exchange of 
information and expertise, as to impose discipline. Contact with the State was at its 
most intense during and immediately after the two world wars, when NZWBA played 
a key role in organizing the wool monopsony of the Imperial Government and in the 
orderly postwar disposal of large surpluses. 
NZPEA’s external environment was markedly different from that of NZWBA. 
While the wool brokers competed in an international wool market, port services 
constitute a derived demand that is specific to the trade patterns of a particular 
locality. Therefore, at most, competition occurred among ports in a locality or 
nationally in some cases. Competitive rivalry was further dampened by the cartel-like 
operation of the four British Conference Lines. Firm heterogeneity produced the main 
external constraint, manifest in the split between the Conference Lines and coastal 
shipping companies that resulted from their different level of ability to absorb 
increased port labour costs. Cooperative behaviour was hindered by this cleft, and 
arguments between the two sets of members arising from their different priorities in 
the payment, allocation and use of labour are abundantly evident in NZPEA 
Management Committee minutes (ATL, 89-395-202, NZPEA Management 
Committee Meetings 297, 314 and 325). 
A contrast with NZWBA is also observable in relations with transacting 
partners. Relations between the shipping companies in NZPEA as buyers of labour 
services, and the labour unions representing the sellers of labour services, were often 
fraught. NZPEA struggled to deal with growing union militancy, prompting eminent 
labour jurist Judge Archer’s complaint that ‘port employers…consistently give way in 
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the face of a threat of strike action’ (ATL, 92-305-01, New Zealand Waterfront Union 
Workers Records, Reference to Minutes of Harbour Boards Conference, 16/3/1966). 
NZPEA’s failure to stem wage drift meant it was unlikely to be built into a 
developmental association. Without the stabilizing effects of such an association, 
corruption flourished at ports to the point where a ‘Pillaging Committee’ was 
established in 1974. This was intended primarily to represent shippers and legal 
authorities, in an effort to halt the theft of cargo from the ships’ holds by port workers 
– whose opportunistic behaviours occurred while under the employ and supervision of 
many NZPEA member firms (ATL, 89-395-133, Pillaging).  
Given these failings it is understandable that NZPEA, in contrast with 
NZWBA, was not granted private government rights to manage and regulate the 
industry. Its lack of internal cohesion and poor relations with other transactors made it 
an inappropriate organization to play that role since it was not well placed to provide 
direction through reflexive learning and interaction among its own members and with 
unionists. By the early 1970s relationships with union representatives had decayed to 
the point where NZPEA described them as ‘extend[ing] very little cooperation and 
do[ing] little or nothing to achieve a harmonious working relationship’ (ATL, 89-395-
131, NZPEA Annual Report, 31/3/1973). NZPEA’s lack of cohesiveness led to the 
capture of rents by stronger industry stakeholders, namely the port unions and their 
federated association (the Waterside Workers Federation). In turn, this inability to 
maintain stability in its transactions with key stakeholders affected NZPEA’s ability 
to work with State representatives in a developmental role. This ultimately led to the 
deregulation of the industry in the 1980s, and the collapse of NZPEA (Reveley, 
2008).  
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When juxtaposed, the comparative cases of NZPEA and NZWBA show that 
internal associative capacity and external relations, in combination, determined the 
industry strengthening capabilities of these associations. Whether an association 
becomes developmental depends on its ability to manifest learning and adaptive 
efficiency, by using past experience and changing environments to modify and 
improve routines. The historical passage of time enables us to make some judgements 
here. NZWBA proved to be an adaptable organization that learned from experience 
and modified its behavior as new situations arose. Across its history, there are many 
examples of NZWBA’s learning and adaptation. The impact of war and postwar 
congestion on the length of the ‘prompt’ (the allowable time period from sale to 
onboard delivery) was handled much more expeditiously during and after World War 
II because it had learned from the drawn-out discussions that had taken place during 
World War I. Similarly, the national roster required significant amendments over 
time, which included extending the selling season and organizing separate North and 
South Island rosters to mitigate private sales and avert congestion. Procedures for 
monitoring sensitive activities, such as weighing and completing accounts of sales, 
were enhanced and more clearly specified over time (ATL, MSX-4323, Wellington 
Woolbrokers Association Letterbook, 17/12/1914). NZWBA’s ability to modify its 
behavior in line with shifts in the external environment is best indicated by its record 
of changing its role as wartime gave way to depression and, later, to postwar 
expansion. Most obviously, the center of its attention shifted from dealing with the 
wool buyers in peacetime to working closely with the New Zealand and British 
governments in wartime. 
NZPEA’s post-World War II performance was very different, because it was 
not an adaptive institution. It exhibited little adaptive efficiency to the industrial 
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change that occurred apace, in the late 1960s, as containerization fundamentally 
altered stevedoring operations (Levinson, 2006). It took the NZPEA until 1976, more 
than a decade after divisions between members stemming from the emergence of new 
types of stevedoring firms was flagged at Management Committee meetings, to 
achieve a resolution that it should reconstitute itself (ATL, 89-395-205, NZPEA 
Management Committee Meeting 634). In the absence of effective organizational 
learning about how to deal with cross-cutting cleavages among NZPEA members, 
increasing member heterogeneity after containerization further reduced the 
opportunities for coordination.  
 
Synthesis of Findings 
Combining the NIE focus on external factors that limit rent-seeking with the OIT 
emphasis on developmentalism and learning enables a richer view of the importance 
of an association’s external constraints. These constraints may be weak and hence fail 
to prevent rent-seeking within an industry (as in the case of NZPEA), strong enough 
to inhibit rent-seeking, or strong and cooperative wherein the focus shifts beyond the 
prevention of rent-seeking to industry developmentalism (as in the case of NZWBA). 
Within NZPEA, rent-seeking occurred in the absence of strong external constraints, 
while for NZWBA developmental opportunities were exploited to develop a highly 
successful alternative to the London wool market. The ability of NZWBA to manifest 
both strong associative capacity and respond developmentally to external influences 
shows that internal strength need not foster an inward-looking culture. Rather, its 
associative capacity was consistent with seeking external ideas and solutions. 
NZWBA’s achievements demonstrate that forceful external controls, such as external 
regulation, are not a necessary prerequisite for shifting an industry association 
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towards an industry development role. The contrasting NZPEA case nonetheless 
suggests that a purely volitional shift in a developmental direction is unlikely to occur 
without external conditions that nudge associations in this direction.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Following Chandler’s (1977; 1990) pioneering lead, business historians are well-
placed to contribute meaningfully to organization studies if they help to theorize key 
facets of organizations. Our comparative study of industry associations fulfils this 
goal of theory augmentation on two counts. First, it has done so by showing how 
business history can be used to merge different traditions – such as NIE and OIT – in 
areas of interest to organization scholars where the existing theoretical literature is 
fragmented or underdeveloped. Understanding an industry association as a distinctive 
type of meta-organization, one whose primary purpose is interorganizational bridging, 
draws attention to its role in connecting diverse members. Bridging-type 
organizations in general and industry associations, in particular, must make links 
between socially and spatially differentiated actors, harmonize their different values, 
and engage with powerful external agencies (Lawrence and Hardy, 1999). Using NIE 
and OIT, we have framed these tensions, respectively, as problems that industry 
associations face in maintaining long-distance control, building social capital, and 
establishing private government rights. Our efforts to re-theorize industry associations 
suggest, therefore, that there is merit in broadening the bridging organization concept, 
beyond its origins in understanding community activism (Brown, 1991), to encompass 
how firms build bridges and connect with one another through meta-organizations.  
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Second, our comparative business historical analysis augments organization 
theory by answering outstanding questions about the determinants of internal 
organizational strength and the wider industry development role of industry 
associations. Expressed in terms of a classic philosophical distinction, we have 
combined NIE and OIT concepts to explain how the internal organizing 
‘potentialities’ of industry associations are converted into actualities (Melchert, 1995, 
p. 615). In counterfactual terms, NIE highlights necessary ‘background conditions’ 
for the formation of industry association cohesiveness (Tucker, 2009, p. 100), namely 
congenial structure and the provision of extensive selective benefits and mediation 
services for members. The NIE concept of associative capacity connotes potentials, 
that is, whereas OIT explains how these potentials are realized through the medium of 
social capital that fosters trust between members of the association, commitment to its 
goals, and the desire to abide by its rules. Thus, the provision of selective goods is 
necessary but not sufficient for an internally strong industry association. Internal 
strength depends on an association having a high level of social capital. The different 
levels of social capital found in NZWBA and NZPEA are instructive since an existing 
literature suggests that labour market associations ‘tend to be less divisive’ than 
product market associations (Traxler, 2007a, p. 24). Our comparative analysis reveals 
the opposite to be the case: NZWBA (a product market association) was replete with 
social capital and proved highly successful and enduring, while NZPEA (a labour 
market association) lacked social capital and was plagued by divisiveness leading to 
its ultimate demise. This finding suggests that levels of associability cannot be 
directly inferred from the industry sector location of associations.  
We have also spelt out the conditions under which industry associations might 
assume an industry development role. This role does not emerge in a straightforward 
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way from an association’s internal cohesiveness and level of social capital, but also 
from the kinds of relationships in its external environment that NIE understands as 
militating against rent-seeking. Our evidence on three external constituents, namely 
competitors, transactors, and the State, points to a situation where constraints mattered 
but their impact was more wide-ranging than merely inhibiting rent-seeking 
behaviour. The interactions with these three institutions enhanced the developmental 
properties of NZWBA. We have shown that its internal strength enabled this 
association to move towards an industry-enhancing role. Moreover, we have built on 
that insight by showing that the reorientation of such an association towards a more 
developmental role drew upon its external architecture, that is, its relationships with 
key constraining institutions, as well as its organic internal properties. Once again, the 
business historian’s counterfactual reasoning plays an important role in teasing out 
these effects. Absent felicitous environmental conditions, there is no guarantee that 
NZPEA would have achieved a comparable developmental role even if it had been as 
internally coherent and rich in social capital as NZWBA.  
While business historians have no monopoly on counterfactual or comparative 
analysis, we have certain advantages in using these methods. Applying them through 
fine-grained analysis of rich historical data helps to develop theoretically and 
empirically grounded propositions about the development and activities of 
organizations, such as industry associations, that have not featured widely in 
organizational research. Counterfactual reasoning provides a different way of 
identifying casual relationships than the correlational approach that is prevalent in 
much normative management theorizing. Rather than looking for empirical 
regularities in cross-sectional data, our in-depth comparison of two historical cases 
has permitted us to highlight the background conditions (provision of selective 
 36 
goods), and then to specify the sufficient conditions (existence of social capital) for 
the success of an industry association. Sufficient conditions can be construed as 
causes (Tucker, 2009, p. 100), so we regard social capital as a cause of NZWBA’s 
success, and its absence a cause of NZPEA’s failure. The role of external institutions 
could be stated in a similar way, but there is a wider point that flows from our 
analysis. To the extent that these theoretically informed causal attributions are novel 
findings, the type of business history research from which they derive is a vital 
steppingstone to establishing generalizable propositions about the properties of 
industry associations. Thus demonstrated, the methodological benefits of business 
history mean that it should not be cast in a ‘supplementarist’ role (Üsdiken and 
Kieser, 2004), as the poor empiricist cousin of organization theory. Our article 
hopefully helps to put business history on a par with organization studies as a 
theoretically generative form of inquiry, rather than an underlabourer discipline.  
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Figure 1. New Zealand Wool-Broking Association Organizational Structure 
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Figure 2. New Zealand Port Employers Association Organizational Structure 
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NOTES 
 
                                                 
 
1 Alexander Turnbull Library archival sources: New Zealand Wool Brokers Association MS-
Group-0489 (MSY-4120, MSY-4133, MSY-4135, MSY-4133-4141, MSX-4323, MSX-4330, 96-223-
01, 96-223-09); New Zealand Port Employers Association MS-89-395 (071, 073, 131, 133, 202, 203, 
204, 205); New Zealand Waterfront Union Workers Records, MS-92-305-01. Museum of Wellington, 
City and Sea archival source: New Zealand Shipowners Federation Records, B/33/10, 3113/93, 106-
108. 
 2 The following wool-brokers’ associations were members by 1911: Auckland, Christchurch, 
Dunedin, Gisborne, Napier, Timaru, and Wellington.  
3 In a ballot a black ball vote by an existing member meant that they opposed the applicant. 
 4 Details of membership were recorded regularly in NWBA’s minute books, which cover 
1907–84 (MSX-4330, MSY-4133-4141). 
 5 In some years, Pyne Gould Guinness had a larger share than Murray Roberts. 
6 In 1957 the Committee comprised one representative each from the four Conference Lines, 
two representatives of P&O’s Union Steam Ship Company (the largest coastal shipping company), and 
one representative each from two smaller coastal shipping companies (Anchor Shipping and 
Richardson and Company).  
7  Similar attributes have been identified in the Scottish woollen knitwear industry (Porac et al. 
1989, pp. 404-5). 
 8 In 1914, for example, the Wellington Woolbrokers Association (WWA) backed down over 
the issue of bank rebates in the interests of associational unity (ATL, MSY 4120, WWA Minute Book).  
9 ‘Spelling’ entailed waterside workers taking an unauthorized period of rest during paid 
working hours.  
